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Abstract 
Using a migration dataset on Ghana, this paper examines the changes in migration and 
remittance patterns of households interviewed in 2015 and 2018. Our findings indicate that 
migration statuses of a majority of household members have not changed in the last three years. 
While political narratives suggest exodus of Africans to Europe, our data shows that a majority of 
migrants moved to destinations within Ghana and Africa. Although a larger proportion of 
emigrants in Ghana is made up of males, migration streams are being feminized. Our multivariate 
analysis shows that social networks are strong determinants of migration. We also observe 
gender differences in the reliance on social networks to facilitate migration, with women being 
more likely to have contacts at destination prior to migrating. A majority of migrants in both 
waves depended on their personal savings for migration. The proportion of migrants funding 
their trips through loans from family and friends have increased between 2015 and 2018, while 
the proportion that financed migration through borrowing outside the family and sale of assets 
declined. Our data shows  that annual real cash remittance received by households over the 
three-year period have increased by about 27% in 2018 and that many of the migrant households 
left behind have reportedly depended on remittances to enhance wellbeing.  The findings suggest 
the need for policy makers to develop programmes to leverage remittances for development.  
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Executive Summary  
While migration is an integral part of livelihoods in many parts of the World, there are contesting 
views on its actual developmental outcomes. Despite the recent recognition that migration can 
contribute to improved livelihoods migrants and their families, there is a general paucity of data 
on migration patterns and the relationship between migration and wellbeing of migrants’ 
households. In Africa, most of the earlier studies on the benefits of migration have focused on 
international migration, although many African migrants move to destinations within the region.  
While a few researchers have examined the developmental impacts of internal migration in some 
countries in Africa, these assessments are largely based on cross sectional data. There is a general 
lack of longitudinal data on migration flows and their impacts of welfare. This paper draws largely 
on longitudinal household survey data generated in 2015 and 2018 in five dominant migrant-
sending regions of Ghana (i.e. Northern, Upper East, Upper West, Brong Ahafo, and Volta regions) 
to examine changes in migration and remittance patterns of households interviewed in rural 
Ghana in 2015 and 2018.  
The findings indicate that most households and their members have the same migration status 
in 2018 as they did in 2015. In 2018, only 15% of persons categorized as non-migrants in 2015 
had migrated, with 12.8% of them becoming internal migrants by 2018. About 7.6% of the 
persons listed as internal migrants and 2.9% international migrants in 2015 had returned by 2018. 
About 21.2% of the internal return migrants and 25% of international return migrants in 2015 
had re-migrated internally as of 2018.  The findings show that re-migration is quite common 
among both internal and international return migrants.  
An analysis of the destinations of migrants indicate that in both 2015 and 2018, over 80% of the 
current (absent) migrants moved to another community within Ghana, with a majority of them 
(65% in 2015 and 60% in 2018) moving across regions in Ghana. A significant proportion of the 
few international migrants migrated to destinations within Africa.  In 2018, only 7.2% of the 
migrants from the five regions were living at destinations outside Africa. There is a significant 
relationship between region of origin and destination of migrants. The proportion of migrants 
that travelled to destinations outside Ghana was highest in Brong Ahafo region, which is the most 
resource-endowed region among the five regions studied. The proportion of migrants moving 
across regions tend to be consistently highest in the Upper East and Upper West regions, which 
are relatively poorer than the other regions.  
With particular reference to the drivers of migration, our data shows that spatial inequalities in 
job opportunities largely account for migration in Ghana. Economic factors (e.g. the need to seek 
work or better jobs) were cited as the main reasons for migration in both 2015 and 2018. One of 
the important factors that facilitates migration in both 2015 and 2018 is social networks.  In both 
waves, the proportion of migrants that had a contact at the destination prior to migration was 
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higher among women than men. The result suggests that more males take risks in terms of 
migrating without a contact person, in comparison with females. Whilst households within lower 
income quintiles were more likely to have a migrant in 2015, in 2018 there was no clear-cut 
relationship between income quintiles and migration, and this is an indication that other drivers 
of migration are becoming more important than poverty. 
Responses from households left behind and interviews with rural-urban migrants in Accra 
indicate that many migrants have been contributing positively to wellbeing of household 
members left behind, through remittances. The average annual cash remittances sent by both 
males and females increased significantly between 2015 and 2018. Male migrants sent more 
remittances, on average, than female migrants in both 2015 and 2018. This may be explained by 
lower wages for women in the informal sector, which means that they send smaller amounts 
(Teye et al, 2017). However, the percentage increase in the mean amount of remittances sent 
between 2015 and 2018 was almost the same (27% for men and 28% for women).  International 
absent migrants sent more on average than internal absent migrants. This is highly expected as 
wages are on average relatively higher for international migrants than for internal migrants. 
Our assessment indicates that in both 2015 and 2018, the proportion of respondents that 
reported that their financial situation had improved within the last five years, prior to the studies, 
was highest among households with migrants than those without migrants. Our results confirm 
the findings in the literature that households with migrants, particularly with international 
migrants, tend to have enhanced household welfare compared to households without migrants 
(Adams, 2007). Consistent with the survey data, a majority (71%) of the rural-urban migrants 
interviewed in Accra reported that their current wellbeing is better than it would have been if 
they had remained at origin.  Based on these findings we conclude that current policy initiatives 
that seek to discourage rural-urban migration are not likely to achieve desired results unless 
spatial inequalities in development are addressed.  We argue that there is a need for policy 
makers and development partners to develop programmes to harness the benefits of migration 
for poverty reduction.  
 
  
6 
 
1. Introduction 
While migration is an important livelihood strategy adopted by individuals and households to 
improve living standards (de Haas 2010; Awumbila et al. 2014; Teye et al, 2017), there are 
contesting views on its effects on welfare of migrant households and socio-economic 
development in migrant sending areas (Murrugarra et al. 2011; Mendola, 2011). Until recently, 
media and academic discussions on migration largely focused on its negative developmental 
impacts, such as pressure on social services in migrants’ destinations and brain drain in migrant-
sending areas (Ajaero and Onokala 2013). However, recent scholarship has shown that migration, 
if properly managed, can contribute to socioeconomic development in both migrants’ sending 
and receiving communities (Teye et al. 2017; UNDESA 2019).  
As a result of this more sanguine perspective on the developmental impacts of migration, it was, 
in 2015, included in the 2030 Global Development Agenda and the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGS). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognized the positive 
contribution that migrants make to inclusive growth and sustainable development in countries 
of origin, transit and destination (OECD/ILO 2018). About 10 of the 169 targets of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) refer to migration-related issues. Despite the recognition that 
migration can contribute to improved livelihoods and socio-economic development, there is a 
general paucity of data on the relationship between migration and wellbeing of migrants’ 
households (Awumbila et al. 2014). 
In Africa, most of the earlier studies on the effects of migration have focused on international 
migration (see for instance, Mazzucato et al. 2005; Quartey 2006; Ratha et al. 2010), although 
internal migration is more common in the region (Teye et al. 2015).  While a few researchers 
have examined the welfare impacts of internal migration in some African countries (see Litchfield 
and Waddington 2003; Castaldo et al. 2012), these assessments are largely based on cross 
sectional data. Relying on panel data generated in 2015 and 2018, this paper examines the effects 
of internal and international migration on the welfare of migrants’ households in Ghana. The 
paper provides a detailed analysis of the changes in the incidence of migration, reasons for 
migration, destination of migrants, remittances and welfare of migrants’ households in Ghana.  
 
2. Literature Review  
As a way of providing an illuminating context for the subsequent discussions in this paper, this 
section presents a review of the literature on key migration concepts, the drivers of migration 
and patterns of migration with specific reference to Ghana.  
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2.1 Defining Migration 
Although migration is, historically, an aspect of life, it entails different types of movements 
(Awumbila et al, 2014). Because of this diversity, there is no universally accepted definition for 
the process. The Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) defines a migrant as a person who has moved 
and stayed at his/her current place of residence for at least one year (GSS 2008). This definition 
does not cover seasonal migrants, who usually move and stay at their destinations for less than 
a year. Following previous Migrating out of Poverty studies, we used migration to refer to the 
movement of people across a territorial boundary often involving a change in their place of usual 
residence. Drawing on Bilsborrow et al (1984: 146) we define a migrant as anyone who used to 
live in the household and left to go away from the village/town/city in the past 8 years, and with 
duration of absence, or intended absence, of at least 3 months. This definition allowed us to 
cover seasonal migrants.  The current migrant category was further divided into internal migrants 
(those who moved from one geographical area to another geographical area within Ghana) and 
international migrants (those who moved from Ghana to another country).  We also used the 
term return migrant to refer to an individual who had been away from his or her usual residence 
for at least 3 months, and who has returned to his native place and lived there for at least 12 
consecutive months before the study.  Defined this way, migrants’ households are those that 
have at least one migrant during the time of the survey. Non-migrant households do not have 
any category of migrant during the time of the study. 
 
2.2. Theoretical Perspectives on Drivers of Migration  
There are a number of theories that can be relied upon to explain the drivers of migration in 
Ghana. These include the Neo-Classical Economic Theory, Push-Pull Theory, New Economics of 
Labour Migration theory, and Network theory among others. The Neo-Classical Economic Theory 
explains migration decision-making processes in terms of geographical differences in the supply 
and demand for labour. It argues that individuals tend to take the decision to move from labour-
surplus, low wage areas to labour scarce, high wage areas. The theory further suggests that 
migration will eventually bring about convergence in wages at the sending and receiving areas, 
and this will reduce migration flows (Todaro and Maruszko 1987). Although the theory can be 
criticized for not recognising the role of other household members in migration decision making 
and also for ignoring the role of social factors in shaping migration decisions, it can be credited 
for explaining how wage differentials shape migration decisions of individuals. Some studies have 
shown that rural-urban migration in Ghana is largely driven by wage differentials (see Abdulai 
1999, GSS 2014). 
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The ‘Push-Pull’ theory of migration posits that migration is driven by pull and push factors 
operating in the areas of destination and origin. The pull factors are favourable conditions which 
attract migrants to the destination, while the push factors are the unfavourable conditions that 
drive people away from the origin (Lee 1966). The theory also argues that apart from the pull and 
push factors, migration decisions are shaped by intervening obstacles, such as cost of migration, 
immigration laws and psychological stress of leaving relatives behind. A major limitation of the 
theory is its failure to explain how different groups will respond differently to the various push 
and pull factors (de Haas 2008). However, the theory is useful for explaining the factors that push 
people to migrate from poor regions to resource-rich regions in Ghana.    
Having criticized the neoclassical theory for assuming that migration decisions are only taken by 
individuals, the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory posits that migration 
decisions are often taken by households to diversify livelihoods and insure the household against 
future risks (Stark 1991). Households may decide that one or more of their members should 
migrate, not just to get higher wages, but also to minimize risks and diversify income sources. In 
rural areas, remittances from migrants can be used during periods of low harvest.  The theory 
can be applied to explain migrants send remittances back to their families left behind.  During 
the economic crisis in Ghana in the 1970s and 1980s, migration became a survival strategy for 
families which depended on remittances (Awumbila et al. 2011) 
The migration network theory suggests that migration flows are shaped by interpersonal ties that 
connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through 
bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin (Massey et al 1993:448). Although this 
theory can be criticised for ignoring economic drivers of migration, it is useful for explaining the 
role of social networks in migration flows and livelihoods of migrants at the destination (Teye and 
Yebleh 2015).  
Our review of the literature on the drivers of migration in Ghana suggests that no single theory 
can fully explain all the different types of migration, given the fact that the drivers of migration 
are complex and multifaceted. In many cases, people take the decision to migrate in response to 
a combination of environmental factors (e.g land degradation, declining rainfall, and 
desertification at origin) (GSS 2014), economic factors (e.g. unemployment, low wages and 
poverty at origin) (see Awumbila et al 2014) and socio-cultural factors (e.g. to join a spouse, 
desire to free from traditional practices and control by elders ) (Anarfi et al. 2003).  
 
2.3. Patterns of internal migration in Ghana 
Migration has historically been an important livelihood strategy in Ghana (Awumbila et al 2011). 
Current internal migration trends are deeply rooted in historical antecedents. In the pre-colonial 
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era (before 1874), migration in what is now seen as Ghana were driven by human needs such as 
favourable ecological conditions, fertile land for agriculture, trade, and greater securituy during 
tribal warfare (Ghana Statistical Service 2014). Most of the ethnic groups in Ghana have moved 
to the present locations in search of better ecological conditions and safe havens (Yaro, 2008). 
Most of the movements in the pre-colonial era were not actually seen as cross border migration, 
since the West African sub-region was seen as a borderless area within which goods and people 
moved freely (Adepoju, 2005).  
Colonial economic and political structures changed the direction and composition of migration.  
For instance, contract and forced labour legislation prompted the movement of labour migrants 
from the northern savannah zone to the mining and plantation areas in southern Ghana (Anarfi 
and Kwankye, 2003).  Based on the assumption that the Northern Territories did not have any 
direct economic value, the colonial administration, in the 1920s, designated the northern zone 
as a labour reserve for the supply of cheap labour for the mines and general labour in the cities 
in southern Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). Many of the north-south migrants were 
predominantly unmarried young men (Amin, 1974), 
After independence in 1957, north-south disparities continue to drive migration from the 
northern zone to the south. In many cases, people tend to move from poor regions to wealthier 
regions and cities in Southern Ghana. Many of the poor people who migrate from northern Ghana 
tend to move to the forest zone to work as farmers. However, a significant proportion of young 
men and women also continue to move to cities in southern Ghana. The main pull factors of 
internal migration in Ghana are employment, income and other economic opportunities which 
are available in the southern urban centres, but limited in the northern and rural areas (GSS 
2014). Recent scholarship has shown that although migration is increasingly being feminised in 
Ghana, males still dominate migration streams (Awumbila et al 2014). In terms of age, a majority 
of migrants in Ghana are young adults (Ghana Statistical service, 2014).  
 
2.4. International migration from Ghana 
Ghana also has a long history of international migration. From the pre-colonial era to the late 
1960s, Ghana’s economy was very strong and therefore received migrants from neighbouring 
West African Countries (Anarfi et al. 2003). During this period, only a few Ghanaians, mainly 
students and professionals, migrated to English speaking countries, such as United Kingdom and 
United States of America. The pattern of international emigration changed in the 1970s and 
1980s as worsening economic conditions and political instability forced many Ghanaians to 
migrate to African countries, notably Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria as well as destinations outside 
Africa, notably Germany, Italy, UK and United States of America. While many Ghanaians continue 
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to move to these countries, the destinations of Ghanaian emigrants have become more diverse 
in recent years (Quartey 2009; Teye et al, 2017).  
Estimates of the number of Ghanaians in various countries, however, vary widely due to paucity 
of data. According to Twum Baah (2005), about 1.5 million Ghanaians were living outside the 
country. Figures provided by UN DESA, however, indicated that the number of Ghanaians staying 
in other countries increased from 470,000 in 2000 to 720,000 in 2010 (53% decadal increase) and 
then 860,000 in 2017. Despite media reports and political narratives which suggest an exodus of 
African migrants to Europe, the majority of Ghanaian emigrants have moved to destinations 
within the West African region. While Quartey (2009) estimated that about 71% of the Ghanaian 
emigrant population resides in ECOWAS countries, a recent assessment by the UN DESA (2018) 
indicated that about 48.7 % of Ghanaian resides in ECOWAS countries. Outside Africa, the major 
destinations of Ghanaian emigrants are in Europe, followed by North America. A gendered 
analysis of emigrants profile of the five top destinations shows that while males dominate 
Ghanaian emigrant stock in countries such as Italy (61% males vs. 39% women), US (59% males 
vs. 41% women), Nigeria (55% males vs. 45% women), women dominate the Ghanaian 
emigration stock in other countries such as Togo (41% males vs. 59% women) and UK (47% males 
vs. 53% women) (UN DESA 2018). 
While West Africa, Europe and the United States of America have traditionally been the popular 
destinations for Ghanaian migrants, recent data shows a massive flow of migrants, especially 
women, to the Gulf States.  This is partly due to strict visa regimes in European and North 
American countries as well as increasing demand of domestic workers in the Gulf States.  
According to figures provided by Ghana Labour Department, in the year 2015, a total of 1,550 
Ghanaian workers were formally recruited by private employment agencies  for job placement in 
four Gulf States, namely Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait with the 
assistance of Private Employment Agencies.  In 2016, the total number of migrants to the four 
countries and Jordan was 2,372. Despite the fact that the government placed a ban on visas to 
the region in June 2017, there is enough evidence to suggest that many Ghanaians still continue 
to migrate to these countries.    
 
3. Research Methodology 
We draw largely on quantitative analysis of longitudinal household survey data, specifically a 
three-wave panel, which is supported by a smaller qualitative data generated through interviews 
with migrants in Accra and Tema. Our earlier MOOP data consists of two waves of panel data 
(2013 and 2015), with 1412 households in March 2013 survey round and 1100 households 
surveyed in March  2015 in five dominant migrant sending regions of Ghana (i.e. Northern, Upper 
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East, Upper West, Brong Ahafo, and Volta). The 2015 study was designed to provide the basis for 
a further round of data collection by eliciting consent to record and retain contact and location 
details of the 1114 households.   
 
In the 2018 study, we did not simply re-survey the 1114 households. Rather we made a number 
of methodological improvements, based partly on our experience of conducting the second wave 
in 2015. Two strategies were employed to address attrition and increase the sample size back to 
around 1400 (i.e. the 2013 figure). First, in each enumeration area, we made efforts to randomly 
select replacement households with similar characteristics to the households who have dropped 
out (since 2015 survey) based on whether they were a household with or without migrants at the 
time of the 2015 wave. The second strategy involved measures to increase the sample size to 
about 1400 and also to include more households with international migrants. The first two waves 
were designed to capture households with internal migrants, resulting in a very small number of 
households being identified with international migrants. To increase the sample size and also the 
number of households with international migrants, we made efforts to randomly select 3 
additional households with international migrants, in each enumeration area. These two 
strategies worked quite well, leading to an overall increase in the number of households to 1429.  
 
In addition to data collection at the migrant source regions, we tracked migrants to Accra and 
Tema and interviewed them. Using contacts provided by members of the migrants’ former 
household at the origin, we tracked 79 of the recent migrants from the second survey (2015) to 
their destinations in Accra and Tema and conducted a questionnaire survey on them. The 
questionnaire survey on the 83 in-migrants aimed at collecting data on the migration process, 
well-being outcomes and other social and economic outcomes (e.g. employment, education 
acquisition, age at first marriage etc). The migrants also provided information on what they would 
have been doing and earning if they had not migrated to Accra.  This innovation would allow us 
to compare results obtained from the econometric analysis of the data from the migrant-sending 
households with those obtained from a more qualitative approach to understanding how 
migration benefits households and migrants. The findings of this paper are however largely based 
on the quantitative data collected at the origin in 2015 and 2018.  
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4. Patterns and Characteristics of Migrant and Non-Migrant 
Households  
Economic reasons for migration give primacy to Ravenstein's (1885) sixth law that individuals 
move in order to 'better' themselves (Hoddinott 1994; de Haas 2010). Therefore, the destination 
options available to the individual shapes migration decisions. For this reason, this section begins 
by describing the destination of migrants across the two survey waves (2015 and 2018) of the 
study and then proceeds to describe the incidence of migration by key individual and household 
characteristics. Also, taking advantage of the panel nature of our data, we examine the extent to 
which migration status of individuals and households have changed since the last survey in 2015. 
Lastly, we explore characteristics of migrant and non-migrant households focusing on changes in 
assets and well-being over the period of the study.  
 
 
4.1 Changes in Migration Status of Households  
The findings show that majority of households in the study regions have at least one migrant in 
another community. The proportion of households without any migrants declined from 48.7 % 
in 2015 to 30.7% in 2018. As shown in Table 1a, in all the regions studied, the proportion of 
households with internal migrants increased significantly between 2015 and 2018, except the 
Brong Ahafo region, where the proportion of households with internal migrants declined from 
36.8% to 28.8%. This may be explained by the fact that the Brong Ahafo region is relatively 
economically stronger and rather attracts internal migrants. The proportion of households with 
international migrants rose quite significantly in all the regions between the two waves except 
the Upper West region where the change was minimal. However, care must be taken in 
explaining the rise in the proportion of international migrants’ households due to the sampling 
strategy adopted.       
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Table 1a: Migration status of all sampled households in 2015 and 2018  
 (Proportion of households with different categories of migrants and non-migrants 
Region Internal 
current 
International 
current 
Internal 
returned 
International 
returned 
Non-migrant Total Number 
of households 
2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 193 2018 
Brong 
Ahafo 
36.8 25.2 13.5 28.8 7.3 1.8 1 4.4 41.5 39.8 258 274 
Norther
n 
27.9 48.4 1.2 3.9 24.0 7.5 0.4 1.4 46.5 38.8 193 281 
Upper 
East 
41.5 55.7 5.2 12.7 10.4 3.5 1 0.9 42 27.2 167 228 
Upper 
West 
40.1 55.4 0.6 7.1 12.6 13.6 0 0.5 46.7 23.4 303 184 
Volta 28.4 53.7 2.0 11.5 8.9 6.9 0.3 3 60.4 24.9 1114 462 
Total 33.8 47.7 4.1 12.9 12.9 6.4 0.5 2.3 48.7 30.7 193 1429 
 
Even though our pooled analysis is interesting, we proceed to take advantage of the panel nature 
of our data to explore changes in the migration status of the sub-sample of households who were 
successfully tracked over the two periods. Changes in migration status of successfully tracked 
households are presented in Table 1b. For households successfully tracked, the proportion of  
without any migrant declined from 49.3 % in 2015 to 38.2% in 2018. As presented in Table 1b, 
the Upper West region recorded the highest decline in the proportion of households without any 
migrant. Specifically, the proportion of households without a migrant for the Upper West region 
declined from 48.3% to 24.5%. This observed result suggests high levels of migration among 
households who were successfully tracked in the Upper West Region. Even though the Upper 
West Region experienced the highest increase in household level migration, a majority of such 
migration were internal, as reflected in an increase in internal migration from 39.5% in 2015 to 
60.5% in 2018. With this high migration incidence in households successfully tracked in Upper 
West region, interestingly the region did not experience any form of international migration.  
 
Another worth-mentioning result for the successfully tracked households is that, for the Brong 
Ahafo region, the number of households without a migrant did increase from 41.8% in 2015 to 
53.3% in 2018. Also, with the exception of the Upper West region, the proportion of households 
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with internal returned migrats reduced over the period of the study. Upper West region 
experienced an increase in the proportion of households with internal returned migrants.  
 
Table 1b: Migration status of successfully tracked households in both 2015 and 2018 
Region Internal 
current 
International 
current 
Internal 
returned 
International 
returned 
Non-migrants Total 
number of 
households 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 
Brong 
Ahafo 
36.9 32.8 12.3 9.0 8.2 3.3 0.8 1.6 41.8 53.3 122 
Northern 24.0 47.5 1.5 3.1 25.0 6.6 0.0 0.5 49.5 42.4 196 
Upper 
East 
41.0 57.1 4.4 3.1 10.6 4.4 0.6 0.6 43.5 34.8 161 
Upper 
West 
39.5 60.5 0.0 0.0 12.2 15.0 0.0 0.0 48.3 24.5 147 
Volta 30.4 50.5 2.5 5.4 7.8 5.4 0.5 1.0 58.8 37.8 204 
Total 33.5 50.2 3.6 4.0 13.3 6.9 0.4 0.7 49.3 38.2 830 
 
Table 1c presents changes in migration status of all households who were interviewed in 2015 
and were successfully tracked in 2018. About 71.2 percent of households with an internal current 
migrant in 2015 still had internal migrants in 2018, while about 6 percent had returned internal 
migrants in 2018 and about 19.8 percent no longer had migrants in 2018 due to reasons like 
falling out of the household or death. For households with international current migrants in 2015, 
about 43.3 percent still had such migrants in 2018 but 30 percent had internal migrants in 2018 
(the migrants returned but chose to stay elsewhere in Ghana). About 23 percent had no migrant 
in 2018, probably due to migrants falling out of the household or   possibly death. For households 
that had internal returned migrants in 2015, the majority (51.8%) of them had their migrants 
moved again to become internal current migrants in 2018. Just about 11 percent were still 
categorised as having an internal returned migrant while 33.6 percent no longer had any form or 
migrants in 2018.  
While 53.3 percent of non-migrant households interviewed in 2015 still have no migrant in 2018, 
approximately 37 percent of them have become internal current migrant households and  2 
percent have become international current migrant households. Over the three-year period, 
6.8% of non-migrant households in 2015 have become internal returned migrants.  This means 
that within the three year period some members of these households migrated and returned. 
Also, the data shows that 0.7% of non-migrant households in 2015 have become international 
returned migrant households in 2018.  
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Table 1c: Transition matrix of household migration status 
    2018 
  
Migration status of households 
Internal 
current 
International 
current 
Internal 
returned 
International 
returned 
Non-
migrant Total 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
2015 
Internal current 198 71.2 8 2.9 17 6.1 0 0 55 19.8 278 100 
International current 9 30 13 43.3 0 0 1 3.3 7 23.3 30 100 
Internal returned 57 51.8 3 2.7 12 10.9 1 0.9 37 33.6 110 100 
International returned 1 33.3 1 33.3 0 0 1 33.3 0 0 3 100 
Non-migrant 152 37.2 8 2 28 6.8 3 0.7 218 53.3 409 100 
Total 417 50.2 33 4 57 6.9 6 0.7 317 38.2 830 100 
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We also explore changes in migration status for individuals interviewed in both waves. The 
evidence, as presented in Table 1d, shows that most people have the same status in 2018 as they 
did in 2015. Precisely, in 2018, the migration status of only 15% of the 4298 persons categorized 
as non-migrants in 2015 had changed. Thus, while 3655(85%) of people interviewed in 2015 were 
still non-migrants, 549(12.8%) were internal migrants and 18(0.4%) were international migrants 
by 2018. The data shows that that emigration rate within the African regions is quite high 
compared with international migration.   In addition, the data shows that 34 (7.6%) of the 446 
persons listed as internal migrants in 2015 had returned by 2018. Following a similarly pattern, 
79.4% of the 34 international migrants in 2015 were still international migrants while 2.9% had 
returned. The study also shows that a majority (78.8%) of the 170 internal return migrants in 
2015 were still internal return migrants in 2018, meaning that they have remained at their usual 
places of residence between 2015 and 2018. However, another 36 (21.2%) of the internal return 
migrants in 2015 had re-migrated internally as of 2018.  While 1 of the four international return 
migrants in 2015 was still at the origin, one has re-migrated to an international destination while 
another 1 has re-migrated internally.  The findings imply that re-migration is quite common 
among both internal and international return migrants. This may suggest that a number of the 
migrants did not adequately prepare for their return. Re-migrations also imply that migrants re-
integration processes are not quite effective  
 
 
 Table 1d: Migration status of individuals in 2018   
Migration status of individuals in 
2015 
Non-
migrants 
Internal 
migrants 
International 
current 
Internal 
returned 
International 
returned Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Non-migrants (4298) 3655 85 549 12.8 18 0.4 71 1.7 5 0.1 4298 100 
Internal migrant (446) 0 0 412 92.4 0 0 34 7.6 0 0 446 100 
International migrant (34) 0 0 6 17.6 27 79.4 0 0 1 2.9 34 100 
Internal returned migrant (170) 0 0 36 21.2 0 0 134 78.8 0 0 170 100 
International returned migrant (4) 0 0 2 50 1 25 0 0 1 25 4 100 
Total 3655 73.8 1005 20.3 46 0.9 239 4.8 7 0.1 4952 100 
 
 
 
4.2. Destination of current migrants  
 
We examined the destination of migrants: the 706 and 1584 migrants recorded in 2015 and 2018 
respectively. As shown in Table 2a, in both 2015 and 2018, over 80% of the current (absent) 
migrants moved to another community within Ghana, with a majority of them (65% in 2015 and 
60% in 2018) moving across regions in Ghana. Migration within the same region is also quite high 
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for both years, with nearly 22% of migrants in 2015 and 18% of migrants in 2018 moving to 
another district in the same region. The proportion of migrants that moved across international 
boundaries was very low in both waves.1 A significant proportion of the international migrants 
were in destinations within Africa.  In 2018, only 7.2% of the migrants from the five regions were 
living at destinations outside Africa. These findings are consistent with recent observations that 
while political narratives and media images suggest an exodus of Africans to the global north, 
Africa has the lowest intercontinental outmigration rates of all world regions (Flahaux and De 
Haas 2016). Our evidence also supports data which shows that In the West African sub-region, a 
majority of migrants (71.7%) move to destinations within the region (UNDESA, 2018).  
 
Table 2a: Destinations of all migrants from surveyed regions 
Destination of absent migrants 2015 2018 
N % N % 
In a different community within this district 49 6.9 132 8.3 
In another district in the same region 153 21.7 281 17.7 
In another region in Ghana 456 64.6 949 59.9 
International (Africa) 42 6.0 108 6.8 
International (Europe) 4 0.6 50 3.2 
International (Americas) 2 0.3 40 2.5 
International (Asia and Middle East) 0 0.0 24 1.5 
All 706 100.0 1,584 100.0 
 
We also made efforts to explore the association between destination for international migration 
and the migrant’s region of origin. The data, as presented in Table 2b, shows that in both 2015 
and 2018, migration from all the 5 regions were largely directed towards another region in 
Ghana. The proportion of migrants that travelled to destinations outside Ghana was highest in 
Brong Ahafo region (16.9% in 2015 and 30.1% in 2018) which is the most resource endowed 
region among the five regions studied. The proportion of migrants moving across regions tend to 
be consistently highest in the Upper East and Upper West regions which are relatively poorer 
than the other regions. Consistent with the Mobility Transition Theory (see Zelinsky, 1971), our 
findings suggest that poorer regions (e.g. Upper East and Upper West regions) tend to produce 
internal migrants, while resource rich regions (e.g. Brong Ahafo) tend to produce international 
migrants. 
  
                                                            
1 In 2015, we had few international migrants due to our sampling approach.   
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Table 2b: Origins and Destinations of Migrants 
Destination of absent migrants Region of Origin of Migrant 
Brong 
Ahafo  
Northern Upper 
East 
Upper 
West 
Volta All 
2015 
In a different community 
within same district 
14.5 10.6 1.3 1.9 5.3 6.9 
In another district in the same 
region 
26.7 26.0 10.1 25.2 22.5 21.7 
In another region in Ghana 41.9 60.6 85.4 71.8 66.3 64.6 
International (Africa) 15.7 2.9 1.9 1.0 4.7 6.0 
International (Europe) 1.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.6 
International (Americas) 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.3 
International (Asia and Middle 
East) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All 100.0 
(N= 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  2018 
In a different community 
within this 
8.7 10.5 4.5 5.3 10.4 8.3 
In another district in the same 
region 
15.3 32.2 8.6 14.5 18.1 17.7 
In another region in Ghana 36.2 51.7 75.4 72.5 60.2 59.9 
International (Africa) 19.2 2.3 4.8 1.0 7.2 6.8 
International (Europe) 10.9 1.1 3.5 1.9 1.2 3.2 
International (Americas) 3.9 0.4 2.6 4.4 2.3 2.5 
International (Asia and Middle 
East) 
5.7 1.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.5 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
In order to further throw more light on internal migration dynamics, we examined the specific 
regions where internal migrants moved to both in 2015 and 2018.  Table 2c present such results. 
 
 
Table 2c: Regions of Destination of Internal Migrants 
 
2015 2018 
Region N % N % 
Brong Ahafo 70 10.8 150 11 
Northern 35 5.4 153 11.2 
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Upper East 32 4.9 45 3.3 
Upper West 30 4.6 47 3.4 
Volta 54 8.3 161 11.8 
Western - - 39 2.9 
Central - - 31 2.3 
Greater Accra - - 442 32.4 
Eastern - - 36 2.6 
Ashanti - - 262 19.2 
In another region in Ghana 426 65.8 - - 
Total 647 100 1366 100 
 
Out of the total of 1,366 internal migrants surveyed in 2018, about 32.4% currently live in the 
Greater Accra region which is the most urbanized region of Ghana. The story is not very different 
from the situation that persisted in 2015 when about 65.8% of the 647 internal migrants moved 
to regions outside the 5 regions surveyed for our study.2 In 2018, the Ashanti Region was the 
second major destination for internal migration from our survey regions, with 19.2 percent of 
internal migrants from our surveyed regions currently residing in the Ashanti Region. The high 
proportion of internal migrants residing in the two most urbanised regions in Ghana (Greater 
Accra and Ashanti regions) can be attributed the level of economic activities and employment 
options available in these two regions. The findings support earlier reports which suggest that 
migrants in Ghana tend to move to urbanised regions (GSS 2007; Awumbila et al, 2014). Largely 
as a result of rural-urban migration, the proportion of Ghana’s population living in urban areas 
increased from 43.8% in 2000 to 50.9 per cent in 2010 and is projected to increase to 63 per cent 
by 2025 (GSS 2012).  
 
In terms of changes in internal migration destinations over the two periods, the data shows that 
migration to the Northern Region has increased considerably over the 3 years of the study. 
Whereas in 2015, only 5.4 % of internal migrants from the five sampled regions lived in the 
Northern Region, in 2018 the proportion that lives in the Northern Region was 11.2%. Similarly, 
the proportion of internal migrants living in the Volta region increased from 8.3% in 2015 to 
11.8% in 2018.  The movement of migrants towards the Northern and Volta regions is attributed 
to recent regional development initiatives implemented in these regions. The northern region, in 
particular, has seen rapid expansion in infrastructure and upgrading of its airport which has made 
migration to the region relatively easier. As a result of the general lack of economic opportunities, 
the Upper East and Upper West regions are still not popular migrant destinations in Ghana.   
                                                            
2 In 2015, we did not ask for the breakdown of the internal destinations outside the 5 surveyed areas.  
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We have so far analyzed the destination of migrants treating the data as separate waves. We 
complete the analysis by examining possible changes in destination of successfully tracked 
migrants. The data, as presented in Table 2d, shows that out of the number of migrants ‘in a 
different community within the same district’, 21.4% are still in a different community within the 
same district whilst 28.6% have moved to other districts in the same region. We observe high 
incidence of cross-regional migration. We find that 50% of migrants in a different community 
within the same district in 2015 have now moved to another region in Ghana The fact that many 
of the migrants who were residing in communities within their districts have now moved to  other 
regions suggests that step migration is a common type of movement. We observe no 
international migration for this sub-group of migrants.  We also find that migrants who were in 
another region in Ghana are most likely to still be in another region in Ghana.  For international 
migration, the data, as presented in Table 2d shows that out of the 16 international African 
migrants in 2015, 18.8% (3 persons) have moved back to another region in Ghana whist 75% (12) 
have remain international African migrant. Only one person (6.3%) have migrated to Europe. For 
international Europe migrants in 2015, we show that 40% remain in Europe whereas 60% have 
returned to other regions in Ghana. These results reflect the point that internal migration is more 
predominant in the selected regions than international migration.  
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Table 2d: Destinations of successfully tracked migrants from surveyed regions in both waves 
  Location in 2018 Total 
Location in 
2015 
In a 
different 
communit
y within 
this 
district 
In another 
district in 
the same 
region 
In another 
region in 
Ghana 
Internati
onal 
(Africa) 
Internati
onal 
(Europe) 
Internation
al 
(Americas) 
 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
In a different 
community 
within this 
district(28) 
6 21.4 8 28.6 14 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 100 
In another 
district in 
the same 
region (55) 
7 12.7 29 52.7 18 32.7 0 0 1 1.8 0 0 55 100 
In another 
region in 
Ghana (152) 
5 3.3 5 3.3 142 93.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 152 100 
Internationa
l (Africa) (16) 
0 0 0 0 3 18.8 12 75 1 6.3 0 0 16 100 
Internationa
l (Europe) (5) 
0 0 0 0 3 60 0 0 2 40 0 0 5 100 
Internationa
l (Americas) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 1 100 
Total 18 7 42 16.3 180 70 12 4.7 4 1.6 1 0.4 257 100 
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4.3. Incidence of Migration by Socio-Demographic Variables  
 
We also examined the relationship between demographic characteristics (gender and age) and 
migration. As shown in Table 3, the incidence of migration among men rose from 14.7% in 2015 
to 21.8% in 2018, while the incidence of migration among women increased from 9.8% t in 2015 
to 15.9 % in 2018. Thus, over the past three years, the incidence of migration among men 
increased by 48% while the incidence of migration among women increased by 62%. The 
evidence shows that even though migration in Ghana is still male dominated, the rate at which 
females are migrating is much higher than the rates at which males are migrating. The evidence 
gives credence to the observed feminization of migration (see Acharya, 2010; Cortes, 2015). The 
feminization of migration is partly attributed to urbanization as women are becoming more 
visible in labor migrants streaming to urban areas due to changing gender roles (Guilmoto , 1998; 
Chant, 1992;). In Ghana, an increasing number of women are migrating independently from rural 
areas to work in the informal sectors of urban areas (Awumbila et al, 2011).  
 
Table 3: Migration incidence by age and sex of migrants   
2015 
Age Category Male Female Total 
all 
males 
migrants % all 
female 
migrants % all migrants % 
10-15 488 25 5.1 496 31 6.3 984 56 5.7 
16-20 483 48 9.9 442 46 10.4 925 94 10.2 
21-30 828 188 22.7 796 134 16.8 1624 322 19.8 
31-40 530 124 23.4 543 64 11.8 1073 188 17.5 
41-56 494 67 13.6 527 28 5.3 1021 95 9.3 
57 plus 346 13 3.8 391 11 2.8 737 24 3.3 
Total 3,169 465 14.7 3,195 314 9.8 6364 779 12.2 
  2018 
10-15 640 44 6.9 592 51 8.6 1232 95 7.7 
16-20 588 89 15.1 537 79 14.7 1125 168 14.9 
21-30 1,117 359 32.1 1,086 299 27.5 2203 658 29.9 
31-40 728 260 35.7 700 144 20.6 1428 404 28.3 
41-56 664 136 20.5 733 70 9.5 1397 206 14.7 
57 plus 452 26 5.8 523 20 3.8 975 46 4.7 
Total 4,189 914 21.8 4,171 663 15.9 8360 1577 18.9 
 
As shown in Table 3, in both 2015 and 2018, the incidence of migration rises with age to a peak 
among 21--40-year group and then declines. Thus, in both waves, the propensity to migrate 
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increases with age to the middle age group and then declines. While the incidence of migration 
basically increased among all the age groups for both males and females, the increase in 
incidence of migration among young persons is noteworthy. Indeed, between 2015 and 2018, 
the incidence of migration among younger household members (10-15 years) increased by 35% 
among females (i,e from 5.1% to 6.9%) and by 37% among males (i.e from 6.3% to 8.6%). 
Similarly, the incidence of migration among persons in the 16 -20 year group increased by 53% 
among males (i.e. from 9.9% to 15.1%) and 41% among females (i.e. from 10.4% to 14.7%).  
 
The incidence of migration also varies across educational attainment categories. It is observed 
that while people within all categories of education are likely to migrate, the slightly more 
educated are more likely to migrate compared to the less educated. For example, of all primary 
school leavers captured in the survey, 12.9% and 17.3% are migrants in 2015 and 2018 
respectively, whereas 28.6% and 35.8% of secondary school graduates are migrants in 2015 and 
2018 respectively. On the other hand, 28% and 44.9% of tertiary graduates captured in our 
surveys in 2015 and 2018 are migrants. One reason for the higher incidence of migration among 
educated people is the fact that they tend to possess more information about employment 
opportunities in urban areas.  According to Van der Geest (2011:170) educated persons in 
northern Ghana prefer to migrate to urban centres than less educated people Van der Geest.   
 
4.4. Multivariate Analysis of Propensity to Migrate in 2015 and 2018 
Even though the descriptive statistics on the incidence of migration are useful to the extent that 
they provide a very simple way of establishing association between migration incidence and 
other important variables of interest to this study, they are limited because other factors may 
also have influence on the variables being considered. Thus, the associations do not control for 
the effect of other variables. Given the limitation of descriptive statistics that are based on cross-
tabulations, we employed econometric analyses to enhance our understanding of factors that 
might influence migration decisions in the regions selected for our study and whether the drivers 
have changed over the 3 years of the study. The econometric results are presented in Appendix 
I. Appendix II present similar econometric specification as in appendix I but controlling for 
consumption quintiles. For the 2018 model presented in appendix II, we also control for whether 
a person was a migrant in 2015. The results and interpretations of the effect of all other variable 
as presented in both appendices (I & II) are qualitatively similar.  
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From Appendix I, column 1 presents the coefficient estimates whereas column 2 presents the 
marginal effects of the variables for 2015. The interpretation of the key results and patterns are 
based on the marginal effect estimates. From the results as presented in Appendix 1 and column 
2 for 2015, females are less likely (about 3%) to migrate than males after controlling for 
individual, household and community–level characteristics. For 2018, consistently, we find that 
females are less likely to migrate than males. This is not the end of the gender story. Based on 
the coefficient on the female head variable, we find that while the coefficient on the female head 
variables were not significant in the 2015 model, this coefficient is significant and positive in the 
2018 model. This estimation result suggests that migrants are more likely to come from female 
headed households than male headed households. This evidence is supported by the earlier 
finding that males are more likely to migrate than females and therefore the absence of the male 
from the household makes the woman a de facto household head. Thus, the likelihood that 
migrants come from a female headed household in 2018 is about 2% more than in a male headed 
household (significant at the 1 percent level).  
 
With regards to real consumption per capita, our data appear to suggest that a higher household 
consumption is negatively related to the probability of a person migrating in 2015 (at 1 percent 
level of significance). The same relationship is weak in 2018, significant at 10 percent level. In 
appendix II, instead of consumption as a continuous variable, we include household consumption 
quintiles. The result on the effect of household consumption on migration in appendix II is similar 
to our conclusion on consumption in appendix I.  In terms of landownership as a driver of 
migration, we find no significant effect of landownership in both 2015 and 2018. What seems to 
consistently drive migration in both 2015 and 2018 is the number of migrants from the district 
and having a network at destination. The coefficients for both variables are positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level in both 2015 and 2018, signalling the role of social networks in 
the migration ecosystem.  
 
Another interesting result of the study is that whereas in 2015 dependency ratio tend to reduce 
the likelihood of migration, we find that for 2018 dependency ratio has insignificant effect on the 
likelihood of migration. Also, whereas in 2015 ethnic groups (Gruni and Grussi) were more likely 
to migrate than all other groups not specified here (the reference group), the Dagbani’s were less 
likely to migrate. In 2018, only the coefficient for Gruni was significant at 10 percent level and 
also with an opposite sign. Thus, the evidence suggests that ethnicity is weak in explaining 
migration. From Appendix II, individuals from all the four regions in the model are less likely to 
migrate as compared to people in the Brong Ahafo region (2015 model). This result is stronger 
when the ethnic variables are removed from the model. The strength of association between 
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ethnicity and migration also increases when regional dummies are removed. If a person was a 
migrant in 2015, it is highly likely that such a person would be a migrant in 2018 (significant at 1 
percent level). To summarize, as explained earlier, we find that one of the important drivers of 
migration in both 2015 and 2018 is social networks measured by the number of migrants from 
the district and having a contact at destination. Thus, our findings show that social networks are 
very important for migration than perceived ethnic and regional differences. Lastly, the our 
probit regression result shows that migrants in 2015 are approximately 12% more likely to be 
migrants in 2018 compared with non-migrants in 2015.  
 
4.5. Migration Processes and Economic Activities of Migrants  
This section focuses on analysis of the migration process itself. It specifically examines changes 
in reasons for migration, sources of financing migration and the role of social networks in the 
migration process.  
4.5.1 Reasons for Migration 
It is known that households migrate for many reasons (Eacott & Sonn, 2006). Table 5 examines 
whether there are have been changes in the strength of the push and pull factors that drive 
migration over the 3 years of the study. For 2018, about 63.5% of survey respondents at migrant 
source regions attributed migration of their household members to work related; notably seeking 
work/ better job (55.6 percent) and job transfers (7.9 percent). This was confirmed by interviews 
with rural-urban migrants in Accra as 72% of them attributed their migration to work-related 
reasons. As shown in the statements below, some migrants in the urban areas explained that as 
a result of spatial inequalities in employment opportunities, they have no choice than to move 
to Accra:  
 
“I came here because there are no jobs in my village. When we completed school, I stayed there 
for three years but there was nothing for me to do. My friends who were staying in Accra 
convinced me to join them here and I think it is good I came. What I get as a security man is 
far higher than what I would have gotten from farming. So you see everybody is coming to 
Accra because there are no jobs in the other regions (Yure, 34 year-old- male migrant from 
northern Region)” 
 
“We are 5 siblings and all of us have moved to Accra. Only our parents are in Mepe now, We 
would have preferred to stay in our own region but there is no work there. I am selling here in 
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Accra and I make some good profit but there [Mepe] no business is good. As there is no work 
there people are poor so nobody will buy whatever goods you send there to sell (Aveto, 41 
year-old female migrant from Volta Region) 
 
As highlighted by Aveto’s statement, apart from inequalities in formal jobs opportunities, 
opportunities to earn higher income in the informal sector is also greater in Accra and other 
urban areas  and this explain why many people continue to migrate to urban centres in Southern 
Ghana.  
Study training is the second major reason for migration, with 16.8 percent of the sample 
migrating in order to study or receive some training. This evidence supports earlier studies that 
show that migration in Ghana is mostly due to inequalities in development indicators which 
necessitates migration to more developed regions for work and education (Black et al. 2006; 
Awumbila et al. 2011). About 7 percent of migrants also moved for the purpose of getting 
married, whereas 8 percent migrate for family reasons. Less than 5 percent of Ghanaians migrate 
for the purposes of accompanying family (1 percent), family dispute (1 percent), declining yields 
in agriculture (0.7 percent), medical treatment (0.4 percent), to join friends (0.2 percent), drought 
(0.1 percent) and civil war (0.1 percent).  
Examining changes in the reasons given for migration between 2015 and 2018, we find that 
economic reasons for migration have increasingly become critical. For example, while 49.6 
percent migrated to seek work or better job opportunities in 2015, the share of migrants that 
migrated to seek work or better job opportunities increased to 55.3 percent in 2018. The share 
that migrated for study and training reasons have increased marginally from 14.3 percent in 2015 
to 16.8 percent in 2018.  Interestingly, the share that reported marriage as a reason for migration 
have increased, from 4.5 percent to 7.4 percent. Migration reasons that have lost importance 
between 2015 and 2018 includes accompanying family and declining yields in agriculture (See 
Table 4). 
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Table 4: Reasons for Migration  
Reasons 2015 2018 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Job 
transfer/opportunity 
49 11.4 29 10.2 78 10.9 80 8.8 45 6.8 125 7.9 
Seek work/better 
job 
276 64.3 78 27.5 354 49.6 625 68.5 251 37.9 876 55.6 
Study training 36 8.4 66 23.2 102 14.3 139 15.2 125 18.9 264 16.8 
To get married 4 0.9 28 9.9 32 4.5 7 0.8 110 16.6 117 7.4 
To accompany 
family 
7 1.6 5 1.8 12 1.7 5 0.5 11 1.7 16 1 
To join family 21 4.9 42 14.8 63 8.8 35 3.8 94 14.2 129 8.2 
Declining yields in 
agriculture 
13 3 4 1.4 17 2.4 8 0.9 3 0.5 11 0.7 
Civil conflict/war 1 0.2 - - 1 0.1 - - 1 0.2 1 0.1 
Family dispute 2 0.5 1 0.4 3 0.4 4 0.4 11 1.7 15 1 
Drought 1 0.2 - - 1 0.1 1 0.1 - - 1 0.1 
To join friends 3 0.7 1 0.4 4 0.6 3 0.3 - - 3 0.2 
For medical 
treatment 
2 0.5 1 0.4 3 0.4 2 0.2 4 0.6 6 0.4 
Others 14 3.3 29 10.2 43 6 4 0.4 8 1.2 12 0.8 
Total 429 100 284 100 713 100 913 100 663 100 1576 100 
 
 
Given the recent policy discussions on the impact of environmental change on migration flows 
from dry regions (Teye and Owusu, 2015), the low proportion of migrants attributing migration 
to drought and declining agricultural yields was unexpected.  However, this finding can be 
explained by the fact that although environmental change and associated declining yields tend 
to contribute to out-migration, they interact with economic factors (Van der Geest, 2011; 
Foresight 2011). Consequently, respondents in quantitative surveys are more likely to link their 
decisions to migrate to proximate economic opportunities (i.e. pull factors) at the destination 
(e.g. job opportunities) rather than the indirect push factors at the origin (such as environmental 
change declining yields). Indirect push factors, such as climate change, may only emerge more 
strongly during qualitative interviews (Awumbila et al, 2014) 
We observed stark gender differences in the reasons given for migration in both 2015 and 2018. 
In 2018, for instance, males tend to migrate more for job search; 68.5 percent of males as against 
37.9 percent of females migrate for job reasons. This is not surprising because in Ghanaian males 
are mostly considered the head of the household and as such, most of the family responsibilities 
lie on their shoulders. Females tend to migrate more (18.9 percent) for the purpose of study or 
28 
 
training than their male counterparts (15.2). Also, more females migrate to join family (14.2 
percent) than males (3.8 percent). This is as the result of the fact that more males tend to migrate 
in search of greener pastures and hence their spouse along the line migrates to join them. As 
expected, more females tend to migrate for marriage purposes (16.6 percent) compared to their 
male counterparts (0.8 percent). Comparing gender differences in migration between 2015 to 
2018, we find that whereas in 2015, 27.5 percent of women migrated for the purpose of seeking 
work/better jobs, after 3 years in 2018 we find that that share has increased to 37.9 percent. The 
evidence shows that the economic reasons for migration is increasingly becoming important for 
women in Ghana. For men, there was a marginal increase in job search reasons from 64.3 percent 
to 68.5 percent.  
Table 5a and 5b further present the distribution of reasons for migration according to other 
background variables; namely age and income quintile between 2015 and 2018 respectively. The 
data shows that the share of younger people migrating for study and training reasons have 
increased considerably. For example, whereas in 2015 about 19.4 percent of migrants within the 
21-30 age group migrated for study or training reasons, that proportion has increased to 42.4 
percent in 2018.  Also, while household within the lower consumption quintiles were more likely 
to have a migrant in 2015, there was no clear-cut association between consumption quintiles and 
migration in 2018, an indication that other reasons for migration, such migrating for studies or 
training are becoming more critical as drivers of migration than the current poverty status. This 
result is also an indication that migrants desire to break intergenerational poverty than address 
current poverty, by investing in human capital and skills needed for higher future incomes.   
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Table 5a: Percentage Distribution of Reasons for Migration in 2015 by Gender, Age and Income 
Quintile  
Reasons for 
migration 
Job  
transfer/ 
opportunity 
Seek work/ 
better job 
Study  
Training 
To  
get  
married 
To 
accompany 
family 
Others No  
of respon 
dents 
 
 
 
N % N % N % N % N % N %  
Age 
            
 
10-15 y 2 4.2 17 35.4 7 14.6 2 4.2 1 2.1 19 39.6 48 
16-20 y 5 5.3 30 31.9 28 29.8 3 3.2 0 0 28 29.8 94 
21-30 y 38 12.5 148 48.7 59 19.4 17 5.6 5 1.6 37 12.2 304 
31-40 y 22 13.2 100 59.9 9 5.4 6 3.6 3 1.8 27 16.2 167 
41-56 y 5 6 53 63.1 3 3.6 2 2.4 2 2.4 19 22.6 84 
57 plus 5 16.1 14 45.2 0 0 4 12.9 2 6.5 6 19.4 31 
Income quintile 
           
 
First 12 7.8 85 55.6 23 15 9 5.9 2 1.3 22 14.4 153 
Second 14 10.9 67 52.3 22 17.2 3 2.3 1 0.8 21 16.5 128 
Third 14 11.5 63 51.6 13 10.7 4 3.3 3 2.5 25 20.4 122 
Fourth 11 9.9 50 45 22 19.8 6 5.4 2 1.8 20 18 111 
Fifth 19 17.4 41 37.6 13 11.9 7 6.4 4 3.7 25 22.9 109 
 
Table 5b: Percentage Distribution of Reasons for Migration in 2018 by Gender, Age and Income 
Quintile  
Reasons 
for 
migration 
Job  
transfer/ 
opportunity 
Seek work/ 
better job 
Study  
Training 
To  
get  
married 
To 
accompany 
family 
Others No  
of 
respon 
dent 
 
 
 
N % N % N % N % N % N %  
Age 
            
 
10-15 y 2 1.6 14 1.6 45 17.2 1 0.9 27 18.6 6 12.2 95 
16-20 y 7 5.6 48 5.5 75 28.6 7 6 22 15.2 7 14.3 166 
21-30 y 44 35.2 376 43.2 111 42.4 64 54.7 45 31 12 24.5 652 
31-40 y 44 35.2 266 30.6 25 9.5 35 29.9 22 15.2 12 24.5 404 
41-56 y 23 18.4 139 16 6 2.3 9 7.7 19 13.1 10 20.4 206 
57 plus 5 4 27 3.1 0 0 1 0.9 10 6.9 2 4.1 45 
Income quintile 
           
 
First 23 18.4 177 20.2 52 19.7 35 29.9 26 17.9 8 16.3 321 
30 
 
Second 13 10.4 209 23.9 46 17.4 19 16.2 31 21.4 18 36.7 336 
Third 20 16 169 19.3 53 20.1 23 19.7 37 25.5 5 10.2 307 
Fourth 19 15.2 184 21 46 17.4 20 17.1 25 17.2 8 16.3 302 
Fifth 50 40 137 15.6 67 25.4 20 17.1 26 17.9 10 20.4 310 
 
4.6. Role of Social Networks in the Migration Process 
The enabling role of social networks in the migration process has been quite extensively 
discussed in the literature (Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Teye and Yebleh 2015). Social contact 
at destination helps to reduce the monetary cost that is incurred through the provision of 
information on migration processes and employment. Social contact at the destination can also 
reduce the psychological cost of migration (Banerjee, 1983; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Anjos 
and Campos 2015). The data on migrants with contact persons in destination is presented in 
Table 6. A majority of migrants (64.9 percent in 2015 and 60.6 percent in 2018) reported that 
they had a contact at the destination prior to migrating. In both waves of our study, the 
proportion of migrants that had contact at the destination was higher among women than men, 
but the gap is wider in 2018 where 54.2% of male migrants had a contact at the destination as 
against   69.4 % of female migrants having contact persons in their destination prior to migrating. 
The result suggest that more males are taking risk in terms of migrating without a contact person 
than females. A number of empirical studies in behavioural economics suggests that females are 
more risk averse than male and evidence can explain the higher risk-taking in migration among 
male migrants (Powell and Ansic 1997; Charness and Gneezy 2012).   
 
Table 6: Migrant already had contact at destination  
2015 2018 
  N % N % 
Gender 
    
Male 261 62.4 498 54.2 
Female 190 68.6 463 69.4 
Total 451 64.9 961 60.6 
Category of migration 
    
Internal migrant 418 64.8 825 60.4 
International migrant 33 66 136 62.1 
Region 
    
Brong Ahafo 110 64.3 146 63.8 
Northern 71 68.9 142 53.2 
Upper East 101 66.9 160 51.1 
Upper West 57 54.8 94 45.4 
Volta 112 67.5 419 73.6 
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When differentiated by the type of migration, we did not observe significant differences between 
internal and international migrants in reported reliance on contact persons in destination.  
Among migrants, 62.1 percent of international migrants reported that they had contact persons 
in destination, whereas 60.4 percent of internal migrants reported the same in 2018.  The slightly 
higher reliance on contact person at the destination for international migrants for both 2015 and 
2018 can be attributed, firstly, to the fact that the resources and the requirements for 
international migration far outweigh that of internal migration. Secondly, with international 
migration, the migrant is very far from home and hence there is the need for assurance that in 
case of emergency there may be someone to rely on. Regardless, these concerns also do exist to 
some extent for internal migrants as well.  
In terms of regional distribution of migrants with contact persons, some interesting findings are 
observed over the 3-year period. Interestingly and increasingly, a huge number of migrants from 
the three northern regions are traveling without contact persons at the destination. For example, 
whereas in 2015 about 68.9 percent of migrants from Northern Region had a contact at the 
destination, in 2018 the percentage of migrants with contact at destination have reduced to 53.2 
percent (almost half are travelling without). For Upper East region the percentage of migrants 
with contact persons at the destination reduced from 66.9 percent in 2015 to 51.1 percent in 
2018. We also find a reduction in proportion of migrants from Upper West region with contact 
person from 54.8 percent in 2015 to 45.4 percent in 2018. Thus, for migrants from the Upper 
West more than half of the migrants in 2018 travel without a contact person at destination, 
suggesting increased risk-taking among migrant households from the Upper West Region. In 
contrast with the situation in the three northern regions, there has been an increase in the 
proportion of migrants from the Volta region relying on having a contact person(s) at destination 
before making the voyage. Specifically, whereas 67.5 percent of migrants from the Volta Region 
reported having a contact at the destination in 2015, the proportion of migrants from the Volta 
Region with contact (s) at the destination have increased to 73.6 percent in 2018. The proportion 
of migrants from the Brong Ahafo region that had contact persons before migrating has not 
changed significantly.  
One important reason for migration from our surveyed regions is for employment or better 
employment opportunities. The natural question that follows is whether migrants have some 
form of guaranteed ‘fixed’ jobs prior to migrating. To answer and discuss this question, we 
present job attachment behaviour prior to migration in our 2015 and 2018 surveys. Table 7 
presents job attachment differences between 2015 and 2018 as well as the association between 
job attachment prior to migration and some impact individual characteristics (namely gender, 
category of migrant and home region of migrant). First and foremost, we find that majority of 
the migrants in 2018 are migrating without any form of guaranteed employment compared to 
the situation in 2015. To be more specific, the proportion of male migrants having a job fixed for 
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them prior to migrating declined from 25.9 percent in 2015 to 17.6 percent in 2018. Similarly, the 
proportion of female migrants with jobs already fixed prior to migration declined from 15.1 
percent in 2015 to 12.3 percent in 2018. Our results show that women are more likely to migrate 
without a job attachment. In putting our results into perspective, we find that even though a high 
number of women are migrating with a contact person at destination, increasingly, women are 
migrating without any employment attachment. Overall, having some form of job attachment 
prior to migration is quite low for both male and female migrants from our surveyed regions, and 
this situation is worsening as shown by the 2018 data. Increased sensitization could help reduced 
the risk of migration with prior job attachment. 
We turn our discussion to exploring whether the type of migration necessitates the need or 
otherwise, for job attachment. In simple terms, we examine the association between internal 
and international migration on the one hand, and job attachment on the other.  The data in Table 
7 shows that a higher proportion of international migrants in 2018 (18.3 percent), compared to 
internal migrants (14.9 percent), had a guaranteed employment before making the decision to 
migrate. We also compared association between job attachment and regions of origin of the 
migrants. The regional data shows that Upper East Region has the highest number of migrants 
without job fixed prior to migration (93.3 percent), which is closely followed by Northern Region 
(91 percent) and Upper West Region (87 percent). Migrants from the Brong Ahafo and Volta 
regions have a relatively high number of job attachment in destination prior to migration 
compared to the other regions, 21 percent and 21.8 percent respectively. In terms of trend in job 
attachment prior to migration, we find that job attachment prior to migration has worsen for 
migrants from Northern, Upper East, Upper West and Volta regions, whereas it has marginally 
improved in 2018 for migrants from the Brong Ahafo region. In summary, we observe in the 2018 
data that job attachment in the three northern regions (Northern, Upper East, Upper West) have 
worsened over the 3 years of the study.  
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Table 7: Distribution of migrants by whether jobs were fixed for them prior to migration by 
gender and category of migration 
Variables 2015 2018 
N % N % 
Gender         
Male 102 25.9 162 17.6 
Female 39 15.1 82 12.3 
Total 141 21.6 244 15.4 
Category of migration 
    
Internal migrant 131 21.8 204 14.9 
International migrant 10 21.7 40 18.3 
Region 
    
Brong Ahafo 33 20.5 48 21 
Northern 18 19.1 24 9 
Upper East 34 23 21 6.7 
Upper West 16 15.8 27 13 
Volta 40 26.8 124 21.8 
 
 
As a follow-up to our earlier discussions on job attachment, we examine for a sub-sample of 
migrants who had job attachment prior to migration, agents who helped in securing these jobs. 
Table 8 presents the information on persons who helped the migrants to find jobs prior to 
migrating. We find that, for both males and females, relatives at the destination (e.g. aunts, 
cousins etc.) played a critical role in securing jobs (21%in 2015 and 29% in 2018). Thus, the 
reliance on relatives for jobs prior to migrating have increased over the two waves. In touching 
on the role of employment agencies, we find that the proportion of migrants who rely on 
recruitment agencies for jobs is relatively high and has increased marginally from 16.1 percent in 
2015 to 17.1 percent in 2018. This result suggests that recruiting agencies have become 
increasingly important in the migration ecosystem.  
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Table 8. Person who helped migrant to find job prior to migration 
Person 2015 
Male Female All 
N % N % N % 
Self 19 18.3 7 17.9 26 18.2 
Father 7 6.7 2 5.1 9 6.3 
Mother 1 1 1 2.6 2 1.4 
Siblings 18 17.3 4 10.3 22 15.4 
Relative 15 14.4 4 10.3 19 13.3 
Community members 4 3.8 1 2.6 5 3.5 
Recruitment agent 17 16.3 6 15.4 23 16.1 
Others 23 22.1 14 35.9 37 25.9 
Total 104 100 39 100 143 100 
Person 2018 
Male Female All 
N % N %     
Self 31 19.3 11 13.8 42 17.4 
Father 6 3.7 1 1.3 7 2.9 
Siblings 20 12.4 5 6.3 25 10.4 
Relative 33 20.5 23 28.7 56 23.2 
Community members 4 2.5 1 1.3 5 2.1 
Recruitment agent 30 18.6 12 15 42 17.4 
Others 37 23 27 33.8 64 26.6 
Total 161 100 80 100 241 100 
 
4.7. Financing Migration  
The mode of financing migration has implications for migrant protection, as some funding 
mechanisms are associated with debt bondage. Our findings suggest that increasingly, self-
reliance is becoming a key mechanism of financing migration. The data, as presented in Table 9, 
shows that majority of migrants (75.3 percent in 2018 and 50 percent in 2015) depended on their 
personal savings for migration. This implies that a substantial number of migrants made their 
own financial preparation in their original location before embarking on the journey. This finding 
may also be due to the fact that many of the migrants only travelled in Ghana and the cost of 
travel is not very expensive. The proportion of migrants funding trips through loans from family 
and friends has increased from 6.1 in 2015 to 14.7% in 2018 when it became the second most 
important source of funding migration. Ilahi and Saqib (1999) using a standard life-cycle approach 
predicts that demand for extended family financing rises with migration costs. Because majority 
of migrants migrate to other places within the country or continent, domestic inflation in general 
and transportation inflation to be more specific, is crucial for migration cost. The average double-
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digit inflation of 14.2% experienced between 2015 and 2018 in Ghana increased cost of living in 
Ghana, including internal migration cost. Even though 12.3 percent of migrants sold assets to aid 
in the migration process in 2015, that proportion has reduced drastically to 4 percent in 2018. 
Reliance on remittances from other migrants has reduced significantly from 7.4 percent in 2015 
to 5.4 percent in 2018.  Overall, we find evidence of increased self-financing of migration in the 
5 study regions in Ghana.  
 
Table 9: Source of Financing Migration by Gender and Wave (Multiple Responses) 
 2015 2018 
 Male Female Total Male Female Total 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Savings 232 53.8 131 45.2 363 50.4 727 79.2 466 69.9 1193 75.3 
Formal loan 8 1.9 10 3.5 18 2.5 6 0.7 2 0.3 8 0.5 
Loan from family / 
friends 
33 7.7 11 3.8 44 6.1 139 15.1 94 14.1 233 14.7 
Borrowing from 
money lender 
5 1.2 3 1.0 8 1.1 4 0.4 2 0.3 6 0.4 
Advance from 
recruitment agent 
1 0.2 2 0.7 3 0.4 4 0.4 5 0.8 9 0.6 
Sale of assets 70 16.2 19 6.6 89 12.3 48 5.2 16 2.4 64 4.0 
Gov't schemes 4 0.9 1 0.3 5 0.7 2 0.2 2 0.3 4 0.3 
Scholarship   25 8.6   10 1.1   10 0.6 
Remittances from 
other migrants in the 
HH 
32 7.4   57 7.9 37 4.0 48 7.2 85 5.4 
Others 103 23.9 115 39.7 218 30.2 97 10.6 136 20.4 233 14.7 
Total  431 113.2 290 109.3 721 111.7 918 117.0 771 115.6 1585 116.4 
 
 
4.8. Occupational Changes of Migrants  
Two important benefits of migration are better jobs and remittances. We now turn our 
discussions to analysing changes, if any, in occupation of migrants after migration and the level 
of remittances received by households left behind. The observed differences in occupation for 
2015 as well as 2018 are presented in Table 10. The data shows that migration has led to 
significant changes in the occupation of migrants. Before migration, majority of migrants from 
our surveyed regions were engaged in agricultural/farm activities (39.5 percent in 2015 and 35.3 
percent in 2018). The share of migrants in agriculture after migration reduced to 20.19 percent 
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and 16.32 percent for 2015 and 2018, respectively.  The reduction in migrant’s involvement in 
agriculture after they have migrated is similar for all regions. The observed decline in involvement 
in agriculture upon migration is sharp for migrants interviewed in 2018 as compared to 2015 (i.e., 
47 percent reduction in agricultural involvement in 2015 migrants interviewed against 53.72 
percent reduction in agricultural involvement in 2018). About 90% and 97% of migrants who still 
remained in farming after migration in 2015 and 2018 respectively were mainly internal migrants.  
Many farmers tend to move from the savannah zone to forest zone where ecological conditions 
are more favourable to farmers (Van der Geest 2011). A significant number of migrants have 
made transition into mining, quarrying and masonry, with a notable increase in trading and self-
employment.  
 
Table 10: Migrants’ Occupation (Before and After Migration) 
Occupation 
Before migration After migration 
2015 2015 2018 2018 2015 2015 2018 2018 
N % N % N % N % 
Farming 156 39.5 311 35.3 106 20.2 186 16.3 
Fishing 13 3.3 11 1.2 13 2.5 17 1.5 
Mining and quarrying 6 1.5 9 1.0 15 2.9 35 3.1 
Masonry 14 3.5 28 3.2 35 6.7 37 3.2 
Driving 15 3.8 38 4.3 30 5.7 60 5.3 
Carpentry 3 0.8 14 1.6 9 1.7 12 1.1 
Teaching 22 5.6 61 6.9 29 5.5 84 7.4 
Manufacturing 0 0.0 8 0.9 5 1.0 25 2.2 
Electrician 8 2.0 9 1.0 9 1.7 14 1.2 
Trading 46 11.6 144 16.3 79 15 227 19.9 
Self employed 22 5.6 52 5.9 38 7.2 74 6.5 
Others 90 22.8 197 22.3 157 29.9 369 32.4 
Total 395 100 882 100 525 100 1140 100 
 
 
4.9 Migrant Remittances 
 
Given that remittances are the most tangible link between migration and development (Ratha 
2007), we also examine changes in remittance receipts from migrants by households left behind 
in our study by comparing real remittance received in 2015 to that of 2018 (Table 11).  From the 
results presented in Table 11, we find that average annual cash remittance received by 
households in Ghana within the last 12 months prior to the research has increased between the 
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two waves. The average annual amount sent by males increased from GHC1073.7 in 2015 to GHC 
1359.1 in 2018. Although the average annual amount sent by females increased from GHC 724.5 
in 2015 to GHC 926.2 in 2018, male migrants sent more remittances, on average, than female 
migrants. From the table, it is obvious that international absent migrants sent more on average 
than internal absent migrants. This is highly expected as wages are on average relatively higher 
for international migrants than for internal migrants. 
 
Table 11: Average annual amount of real cash remittances received from migrants within last 12 
months by wave, gender and destination of the sender (GHC, 2018 prices). 
 
Region 
Male Female All 
mean median std N mean median std N Mean 
2015 
Internal migrant 885.9 420.2 1208 150 689.4 436 796.7 60 829.8 
International 
migrant 
2415.2 1474 2852 21 1777.2 1777 458.2 2 
2359.7 
All 1073.7 442.1 1578 171 724.5 472.3 809.2 62 980.8 
 2018 
Internal migrant 974.1 500 1326 379 578.5 375 637.5 176 848.6 
International 
migrant 
2945.4 2000 2322 92 2201.5 1650 2050 48 
2690.4 
All 1359.1 600 1752 471 926.2 500 1285 224 1219.6 
 
The average annual remittances sent home by migrants received at the regional level also shows 
an improvement in the amounts received (Figure 1). The average amounts sent by males 
increased from 2015 to 2018 for each region, although increases are small for male migrants from 
the Brong Ahafo, Northern and Upper East regions. The same can be said about amounts sent by 
females, although remittances fall slightly for migrants from the Northern and Upper East 
regions. A table with other statistics (median, standard deviation and frequencies) by gender, 
wave and region is presented in Appendix III
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Figure 1: Average annual real remittances by wave and region (2018 prices) 
 
 
 
In terms of regional breakdown of remittances sent to households (see Figure 2), comparing 2015 
with 2018, Brong Ahafo, Northern and Upper West regions registered significant increases in the 
proportion of absent migrants that sent monies to their families left behind. On the other hand, 
the Upper East and Volta regions experienced a reduction in their respective proportions of 
absent migrants that sent monies to households left behind.  
 
Figure 2: Proportions of absent migrants that sent monies to households left behind 
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Figure 3: Proportion of households that received cash remittances 
 
 
In Figure 3 above, we see the distribution of the proportions of households (with absent 
migrants) that received cash remittances (which given that some households have more than 
one migrant is different from the proportion of migrants who send money home). Unlike the 
proportions of migrants that sent monies to households of origin, a clear pattern emerges with 
the share of households that received cash remittances. Between 2015 and 2018, there were 
increases across regions in the proportion of households (with absent migrants) that received 
cash remittances. For example, the Brong Ahafo region registered a 28-percentage point increase 
from 36 percent (in 2015) to 64 percent (in 2018). 
Interestingly, in the case of the receipt of in-kind remittances, a converse pattern is observed 
(see Figure 4). Without exception, households across the regions with absent migrants 
experienced considerable reductions in the proportions that received in-kind remittances. In 
some cases, the reductions were so drastic, as seen in the case of the Upper West region, where 
the proportion dropped from 40 percent (in 2015) to 3 percent in 2018. This decline may be 
explained by the fact that it is now easier to send cash, due to mobile banking. On the other hand, 
transportation costs in Ghana have increased tremendously due to rising fuel costs and this 
makes it difficult for migrants to send in-kind remittances.   
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Figure 4: Proportion of households that received cash remittances 
 
Regarding the frequency with which migrants send remittances to households left behind, most 
migrants transferred remittances on special occasions. Specifically, 46.2 percent and 30.5 
percent of migrants sent remittances on special occasions in 2015 and 2018, respectively. Given 
the unit costs associated with the transfer of money, it is not surprising that weekly and 
fortnightly transfers are the least common among migrants. In 2018 and 2015, only 1.1 percent 
of migrants sent remittances weekly, while 3.6 % and 1.7 percent of migrants interviewed in 2015 
and 2018 respectively indicated sending remittances every fortnight.  
Table 12. Frequency of transfers 
Frequency of transfers  2015 2018 
Weekly 1.1 1.1 
Fortnightly 3.6 1.7 
Monthly 14.7 19.5 
Every couple of months 20.1 33.6 
Every six months 7.5 5.4 
Every year 6.8 8.3 
Only on special occasions 46.2 30.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Expressing households’ cash remittance receipts (from absent migrants) in constant 2018 prices 
(adjusting for inflation), we observe an appreciable increase in mean household cash remittance 
receipts between 2015 and 2018. Whereas the mean amount of cash remittances received by 
households in 2015 was GHC993, the corresponding amount for 2018 was GHC 1297.2 (see Table 
13 and Figure 6). The regional breakdown of households’ cash remittance receipts shows that 
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households in the Brong Ahafo region received, on average, the highest amounts of remittances 
in both 2015 (GHC 2058.1) and 2018 (GHC 2192.3). Except for households in the Northern region, 
households in each of the other four regions registered increases in mean cash remittances 
received from absent migrants. Households in the Upper West, Volta, and Brong Ahafo regions 
enjoyed marked increases in average cash remittances received from absent migrants (see Figure 
17). It is worth noting also that cash remittances received by households from absent migrants 
were considerably more dispersed in 2018 than they were in 2015 (see Table 13).  
Table 13: Total cash remittances received by households from all absent migrants by wave, 
gender of the household head and region (2018 prices) 
Region 2015 2018 
male head Female head  All male head  female head All 
mean N mean N mean mean N mean N mean 
Brong Ahafo 1962.7 26 2306.0 10 2058.1 2144.3 62 2298.6 28 2192.3 
Northern 804.1 24 330.6 4 736.5 693.1 75 775 8 701.0 
Upper East 625.4 35 729.8 15 656.7 823.1 75 481 25 737.6 
Upper West 881.7 29 1202.4 10 963.9 2224.7 62 979.8 22 1898.7 
Volta 754.2 21 362.9 13 604.6 1172.1 78 1082.8 74 1128.6 
Total 989.8 135 1001.4 52 993.0 1352.3 352 1173.7 157 1297.2 
 
Figure 6: Households’ real mean cash remittances 
 
It is useful to discuss the association between households’ cash remittance receipts and the 
migration status of the household. In the context of remittances received from absent migrants, 
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the relevant household categories for which we discuss associations are households with internal 
migrants only, those with international migrants only, and households with both internal and 
international migrants. As presented in Figure 7, we find that for each household migration 
category, the mean real cash remittances (received from absent migrants) have increased 
between 2015 and 2018, except for internal migrants only where there was a slight drop from 
GHC 840.1 to GHC 829.1. For example, in the case of households with international migrants only, 
the mean remittances received in 2018 exceeded the corresponding amount in 2015 by GHC 
368.7 (see Figure 18). The statistics for households with both internal and international migrants 
also show that the 2018 mean amount of remittances received was GHC 559.9 higher than the 
amount received in 2015. These observations suggest that the overall increase in households’ 
mean cash remittance receipts between 2015 and 2018 is driven mainly by increases in 
international migrant remittances. 
Figure 7: Households’ real mean cash remittances received by migration status 
 
 
4.10. Effects of Migration on the Subjective Well-being of Migrant 
Households 
It is legitimate to presume that the main reason underlying the decision to migrate is the 
anticipation of an improvement in welfare (Awumbila et al, 2016). It is therefore useful in this 
study to discuss the link between migration and welfare. In this paper, we carry out a preliminary 
analysis of the relationship between household migration status and the subjective well-being of 
the household.  
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Households left behind were asked about the adequacy of their current financial situation to 
meet their household needs. Table 14 compares the financial situation of households across the 
different migration statuses.  Table 14 shows that, irrespective of their migration status, the 
proportion of households that subjectively reported improved financial situation within the last 
five years prior to the research was higher in 2018 than 2015. For example, 51.6 percent of 
households with internal current migrants perceive an improvement in their financial situation 
compared with 33.2 percent in 2015.  Also, 67 percent of households with international current 
migrants felt their financial situation has improved in 2018 compared with 45.2 percent in 2015. 
In terms of returned migrant households, we find that in 2018, 53.9 percent of households with 
internal returned migrants perceived their financial situation has improved whereas in 2015, the 
corresponding statistic was 28.2 percent. We show that for subjective welfare, for any group of 
migrant households, 2018 registered a higher percentage of households perceiving an 
improvement in their financial situation compared to the 2015 statistic. Using the two waves of 
the survey data, our results confirm the findings in the literature that households with migrants, 
particularly with international migrants, tend to have enhanced household welfare (see Adams, 
2007; Cuong 2009; Ratha 2010; Serbeh et al 2015).  
 
 
Table 14: Subjective perception of change in financial situation in past 5 years by migrant type 
  2015 2018 
current 
preference Improved 
Remained 
the same Deteriorated Total Improved 
Remained 
the same Deteriorated Total 
Internal 
current 33.2 33.7 33.2 100 51.6 28.0 20.4 100 
International 
current 45.2 16.7 38.1 100 67.0 15.7 17.3 100 
Internal 
returned 28.2 29.6 42.2 100 53.9 28.6 17.6 100 
International 
returned 40.0 0.0 60.0 100 42.4 33.3 24.2 100 
Non-migrant 29.6 33.3 37.1 100 40.2 32.7 27.2 100 
Total 31.2 32.2 36.6 100 50.0 28.0 22.0 100 
 
Table 15 presents evidence on gender differences in perceived changes in financial situations 
over the preceding two years. Whilst 52.6 percent of households with male heads perceived an 
improvement in their financial situation (improved a lot and somewhat improved) in 2018, the 
corresponding statistic for households with female heads is 43.7 percent. These figures in 2018 
reflect an increase in perceived financial improvement over the 2015 figures.  For example, in 
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2015, only 29.8 percent of female-headed households reported a perceived imrpovement in their 
financial situation, with the corresponding figure for male-headed households being 31.7 
percent. Figure 11 shows, that overall, 2018 registered a higher percentage of households 
perceiving an improvement in their finanacial situation, that is, relative to the percentage of 
households that held such a view in 2015.  
 
Table 15: Subjective perception of financial situation, by wave and gender of household head 
Financial status Male Female 
2015 2018 2015 2018 
N % N % N % N % 
Improved a lot 28 3.5 61 6 7 2.4 25 6 
Somewhat improved 227 28.2 472 46.6 81 27.4 157 37.7 
Remained the same 262 32.6 274 27 92 31.1 126 30.3 
Somewhat deteriorated 193 24 142 14 66 22.3 89 21.4 
Deteriorated a lot 94 11.7 64 6.3 50 16.9 19 4.6 
Total 804 100 1013 100 296 100 416 100 
 
Figure 11: Subjective perception of change in financial situation over the past two years  
 
 
Given that perception of wellbeing among households left behind may be different from 
perception of wellbeing among migrants, we also examined the perception of the 79 rural-urban 
migrants in Accra. The responses of the migrants support the survey data, as a majority of them 
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they had not migrated. As shown in Box 1, these migrants cited several examples of how they are 
contributing significantly to the welfare of the family members back home, through remittances:  
Box 1: Views of rural-urban migrants on how they are contributing the wellbeing of households 
at the origin  
 
“My family would have been worse off if I had not migrated. I say that because my remittances 
back home helps the family a lot in their economic activities.” (Aduty  20 year-old male 
migrants, Brong Ahafo) 
“Migrating has given me good access to education and employment so that I am able to help 
those back home financially when the need arises.” (Akra, 26 year-old migrant from  Volta 
Region) 
 
“If I were there I would be a burden to them and the little money they will get will be used on 
me of which they don't also have much, Being in Accra has made me secured a job and also 
taken care of the family back home. I would be worse if I hadn't come to Accra” (Gumah 
Shamuna, male, 28 years, Northern) 
 
“,,,,, despite the fact that my monthly earnings is not that much I'm still able to send some to 
my parents and children which I won't have gotten that money if I was still in Upper West” 
(Dum, 44 year–old female migrants from, Upper West) 
 
“Back home things were extremely difficult but now I can say with migration my family back 
home is financially better off with my help.” (Awin , 39 year-old male migrants from  Upper 
East) 
 
On the other hand, only about 13% of male migrants and 6% of female migrants believed that 
their families back home would have been economically better off if they had remained at the 
origin. These migrants explained that migration has worsen the welfare of their households 
because  they (migrants) are not doing well in the city and are unable to send remittances back 
home ( see Box 2) 
“Family would have been better off if I had not migrated because I really used to support them 
back home with the little income I was earning because I was not buying anything I eat free 
and drink free of charge. Now in my current state I buy everything including water to drink and 
bath.” (Huvorimo, 23 year –old male migrants from Brong Ahafo) 
 
“I'm not able to financially support them adequately since business is not moving on 
systematically.  Thus, at times I can make more money at times too I lose.” (Samil , 30 year- old 
migrant from Upper East) 
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“I would  have earned more money than I get now. Without the stress of rents and utility bills 
would not have been there so my family would have benefited more from me.” (Maryet, 30 –
year-old male migrant from  Volta region) 
 
The migrants in Accra were also asked questions about how migration has contributed to their 
own wellbeing in the city. In response, about 73 % of the male migrants and 69% of female 
migrants reported that current wellbeing in Accra is better than it would have been if they had 
remained at the origin. The migrants gave several reasons why migration has enhanced their 
wellbeing and this includes availability of social amenities, employment opportunities, improved 
income, among others as cited bellow:  
 
“I was looking for job and in depression. Migration has given me exposure and has trained in 
fitting / mechanic. I get jobs to do alongside which gives me money.” (Gagu, 24 year-old male 
migrant from Volta Region) 
“My current wellbeing here with migration is better off because out of what I get, I’m able to 
remit home and at least buy few basic stuffs for myself” (Wasila Iddrisu, female, 29 years, 
Northern) 
I have access to better social amenities that I wouldn't have had if I were still at Abutiakope” 
(Amedzi, 22 year-old female migrant from Volta region) 
“My current wellbeing without migration would have been worse off. Migration has really 
helped me because I'm able to save, buy basic things for myself and also remit home.” (Adu 
Isaac, male, 20 years, Brong Ahafo) 
On the other hand, a few rural-urban migrants (16% of males and 19% of females) feel that their 
wellbeing in the City is worse than it would have been in they had remained at the origin.  These 
people also cited a number of reasons such as inability to get jobs, stressful life in Accra and low 
earnings:  
“My wellbeing currently is worse off with migration. I am now unemployed” (Puri, 32 year-old 
female migrant from Brong Ahafo) 
“This is due to the fact the cost of living back home is relatively cheap as compared to Accra. 
For instance I won't be paying rent and buying food stuffs at a high price whiles in Upper East 
such food stuffs are less expensive.” (Samilatu, 30 year-old male migrant from Upper East) 
47 
 
“I'm not earning enough from my work and that has made life in Accra difficult. For instance, 
the little I earn cannot even feed me three times daily not to even talk about bills like rernt and 
the others.” (Tam 40 year-old male migrant from Upper East) 
“This is because the cost of living in Accra is expensive as compared to Upper West and 
moreover I'm not working making things sometimes difficult.” (Nyalat, 26 year-old female 
migrant from Upper West) 
The revelation by these migrants that migration has worsened their wellbeing demonstrates that 
while migration to urban centres offer a number of opportunities to some people to enhance 
their livelihoods, it also sometimes leads to declining living standards, especially among those 
who are not able to secure good jobs.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
This paper relied on two rounds of a household survey implemented in 2015 and 2018 to examine 
migration and remittance patterns, as well as the relationships between internal/intraregional 
migration and well-being of migrants’ households in Ghana.  The issues examined include the 
incidence and patterns of migration and remittance flows, differences in wealth between migrant 
and non-migrant households, factors influencing the propensity to migrate, and the association 
between migration and wellbeing. With the exception of the analysis of the propensity to 
migrate, we have generally employed descriptive statistics to examine the issues of interest.  
We have demonstrated that the migration statuses of a majority of households remained the 
same. About 13% of persons categorised as non-migrants in 2015 became internal migrants by 
2018.  About 21% of internal return migrants and 25% of international return migrants in 2015 
re-migrated by 2018. This suggests that re-integration processes are ineffective.   
Despite media images and political narratives that suggest an exodus of Africans to Europe, 
internal migration is still a dominant form of migration in Ghana. Consistent with the literature 
on feminisation of migration (Acharya, 2010; Cortes, 2015), although migration in Ghana is still 
male dominated, the rate at which females are migrating is much higher than the rates at which 
males are migrating. Our multivariate analysis shows that social networks constitute an 
important determinant of the propensity to migrate. Whilst households within lower income 
quintiles were more likely to have a migrant in 2015, in 2018 there is no clear-cut impact of 
income quintiles on migration, an indication that other reasons for migration are becoming more 
important. Consistent with earlier findings (see Awumbila et al. 2011; Black et al. 2006), spatial 
inequalities in job opportunities still account for internal migration in the country. However, the 
proportion of migrants that migrated for marital purposes or education and training has 
48 
 
increased.  Despite the prominence given to environmental drivers of migration in academic and 
policy circles (Teye and Owusu, 2015), only a few migrants reportedly moved because of 
environmental degradation.  
We also observe gender differences in the reliance on social networks to facilitate migration, with 
women being more likely to have contacts at destination prior to migrating. The study also found 
that the proportion of migrants that relied on social networks at the destination for migration 
and employment declined among those from the three northern regions compared with their 
counterparts from Volta and Brong Ahafo regions. On the policy front, we argue that more 
sensitization and migration interventions may be needed in the three northern regions to help 
curb migration risk-taking. This is important to help address the exploitation of young migrants 
to large cities.  
A majority of migrants in both waves depended on their personal savings for migration. This 
implies that a substantial number of migrants made their own financial preparation at their 
original location before embarking on the journey. The proportion of migrants funding the trips 
through loans from family and friends has increased between 2015 and 2018, while the 
proportion that financed migration through borrowing and sale of assets declined. Reliance on 
remittances from other migrants to fund migration has also reduced significantly between 2015 
and 2018.  Overall, we find evidence of increased self-financing of migration in the five study 
regions.  
There is an increase in the amount of remittances received by households. Overall, female 
remittance amounts have seen some improvement since 2015. Our results confirm the findings 
in the literature that households with migrants, particularly with international migrants, tend to 
have enhanced household welfare compared to households with internal migrants (see Adams, 
2007; Cuong, 2009; Ratha, 2010; Serbeh et al, 2015). The receipt of international remittances 
appears to be dominant in influencing welfare. Generally, households left behind believe that the 
migration of a member has improved the household’s wellbeing.  While some of the migrants in 
Accra complained about how migration has worsen their families’ wellbeing because they are 
unable to good jobs, many of them reported that migration has enhanced their own wellbeing as 
well as the wellbeing of their families left behind. The findings suggest the need for policy makers 
to develop programmes to reduce the risks associated with migration and leverage remittances 
for poverty reduction in migrants’ sending areas.   
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Appendix I 
Determinants of Migration : probit models 
Sample: Individuals 16-64 years old; dependent variable: current migrant equals 1 and zero otherwise 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2015 2018 
VARIABLES b's mfx b's mfx 
Household real consumption per capita in 
hundreds (2018 prices) -0.0184*** -0.0021*** -0.0040* -0.0006* 
  (0.0033) (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0003) 
Household owns Land  -0.0642 -0.0075 0.0475 0.0068 
  (0.0643) (0.0075) (0.0534) (0.0076) 
Number of migrants from the district 0.0058** 0.0007** 0.0032*** 0.0005*** 
  (0.0024) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0002) 
Dependency ratio (below 16 and above 
65/hh size) -0.9095*** -0.1060*** -0.1913 -0.0274 
  (0.1658) (0.0195) (0.1317) (0.0189) 
Education of person: base is none-Primary -0.3547*** -0.0413*** -0.2787*** -0.0399*** 
  (0.1082) (0.0127) (0.0907) (0.0130) 
Middle/JSS 0.0595 0.0069 -0.0712 -0.0102 
  (0.0854) (0.0100) (0.0700) (0.0100) 
High -0.0230 -0.0027 0.2145*** 0.0307*** 
  (0.0998) (0.0116) (0.0729) (0.0104) 
Tertiary 0.4172*** 0.0486*** 0.6032*** 0.0863*** 
  (0.1292) (0.0151) (0.0845) (0.0121) 
Female -0.2683*** -0.0313*** -0.4112*** -0.0589*** 
  (0.0600) (0.0070) (0.0491) (0.0071) 
Youth (15-24 years) 0.1058 0.0123 -0.0456 -0.0065 
  (0.1613) (0.0188) (0.1350) (0.0193) 
Ethnic: Akan (all others as base) 0.0307 0.0036 0.0808 0.0116 
  (0.1336) (0.0156) (0.1188) (0.0170) 
Ga-Dangme -0.2004 -0.0234 -0.4983 -0.0713 
  (0.2943) (0.0343) (0.4113) (0.0589) 
Ewe 0.0741 0.0086 0.2083 0.0298 
  (0.1572) (0.0183) (0.1493) (0.0214) 
Guan -0.2172 -0.0253 0.2339 0.0335 
  (0.1890) (0.0220) (0.2232) (0.0319) 
Dagbani -0.2230** -0.0260** 0.1121 0.0160 
  (0.0893) (0.0104) (0.0956) (0.0137) 
Gruni 0.5497*** 0.0641*** -0.2014 -0.0288 
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  (0.1551) (0.0181) (0.1621) (0.0232) 
Grussi 0.4944 0.0576 -0.2477 -0.0355 
  (0.3180) (0.0371) (0.2496) (0.0357) 
Female head -0.0020 -0.0002 0.1535*** 0.0220*** 
  (0.0706) (0.0082) (0.0567) (0.0081) 
Age of household head 0.0039** 0.0005** 0.0049*** 0.0007*** 
  (0.0020) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0002) 
Education of household head: primary 0.0533 0.0062 0.0857 0.0123 
  (0.1177) (0.0137) (0.1096) (0.0157) 
Middle/JSS -0.1549* -0.0181* 0.1616** 0.0231** 
  (0.0932) (0.0109) (0.0720) (0.0103) 
High 0.0071 0.0008 0.0350 0.0050 
  (0.1423) (0.0166) (0.0974) (0.0139) 
Tertiary 0.0168 0.0020 -0.0910 -0.0130 
  (0.1243) (0.0145) (0.0905) (0.0129) 
age of person in years -0.0072*** -0.0008*** -0.0091*** -0.0013***  
(0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0003) 
Region: Northern  (Brong Ahafo as base) -0.5059*** -0.0590*** -0.0882 -0.0126  
(0.1325) (0.0155) (0.1335) (0.0191) 
Upper East -0.3209** -0.0374** 0.1553 0.0222  
(0.1366) (0.0160) (0.1287) (0.0184) 
Upper West -0.3056** -0.0356** 0.1661 0.0238  
(0.1326) (0.0155) (0.1309) (0.0187) 
Volta -0.2698* -0.0314* -0.0873 -0.0125  
(0.1577) (0.0184) (0.1467) (0.0210) 
Network at destination (Dummy) 3.1872*** 0.3714*** 4.5053*** 0.6449***  
(0.1130) (0.0137) (0.3215) (0.0462) 
Constant -0.6016***  -1.4155***   
(0.2076)  (0.1714)  
Observations 4,958 4,958 6,658 6,658 
Pseudo-R2 0.4657  0.499  
Standard errors in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix II 
Determinants of Migration (including consumption quintiles and controlling being a migrants 
in 2015 for the 2018 model) : probit models 
 
Sample: Individuals 16-64 years old; dependent variable: current migrant equals 1 and zero otherwise 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2015 2018 
VARIABLES b's mfx b's mfx 
Household owns Land  -0.0502 -0.0058 0.0009 0.0001 
 (0.0647) (0.0075) (0.0545) (0.0075) 
Number of migrants from the district 0.0055** 0.0006** 0.0033*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0002) 
Dependency ratio (below 16 and above 
65/hh size) -0.9073*** -0.1056*** -0.1639 -0.0226 
 (0.1663) (0.0195) (0.1346) (0.0185) 
Education of person: base is none-Primary -0.3547*** -0.0413*** -0.2672*** -0.0368*** 
 (0.1085) (0.0127) (0.0927) (0.0128) 
Middle/JSS 0.0665 0.0077 -0.0326 -0.0045 
 (0.0857) (0.0100) (0.0715) (0.0098) 
High -0.0188 -0.0022 0.2374*** 0.0327*** 
 (0.0999) (0.0116) (0.0743) (0.0102) 
Tertiary 0.4145*** 0.0482*** 0.6242*** 0.0860*** 
 (0.1294) (0.0151) (0.0860) (0.0118) 
Female -0.2679*** -0.0312*** -0.3717*** -0.0512*** 
 (0.0601) (0.0070) (0.0500) (0.0069) 
Youth (15-24 years) 0.1098 0.0128 -0.0443 -0.0061 
 (0.1612) (0.0188) (0.1363) (0.0188) 
Ethnic: Akan (all others as base) 0.0155 0.0018 0.0606 0.0084 
 (0.1332) (0.0155) (0.1211) (0.0167) 
Ga-Dangme -0.2118 -0.0246 -0.5114 -0.0705 
 (0.2945) (0.0343) (0.4119) (0.0568) 
Ewe 0.0801 0.0093 0.1627 0.0224 
 (0.1576) (0.0183) (0.1515) (0.0209) 
Guan -0.2156 -0.0251 0.2459 0.0339 
 (0.1900) (0.0221) (0.2250) (0.0310) 
Dagbani -0.2180** -0.0254** 0.0624 0.0086 
 (0.0902) (0.0105) (0.0974) (0.0134) 
Gruni 0.5263*** 0.0612*** -0.3089* -0.0426* 
 (0.1562) (0.0182) (0.1663) (0.0229) 
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Grussi 0.5553* 0.0646* -0.3034 -0.0418 
 (0.3194) (0.0372) (0.2553) (0.0352) 
Female head 0.0063 0.0007 0.1546*** 0.0213*** 
 (0.0706) (0.0082) (0.0577) (0.0079) 
Age of household head 0.0042** 0.0005** 0.0048*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0002) (0.0017) (0.0002) 
Education of household head: primary 0.0728 0.0085 0.0894 0.0123 
 (0.1185) (0.0138) (0.1123) (0.0155) 
Middle/JSS -0.1447 -0.0168 0.1847** 0.0255** 
 (0.0936) (0.0109) (0.0734) (0.0101) 
High 0.0552 0.0064 0.0605 0.0083 
 (0.1432) (0.0167) (0.0987) (0.0136) 
Tertiary -0.0078 -0.0009 -0.0909 -0.0125 
 (0.1243) (0.0145) (0.0921) (0.0127) 
age of person in years -0.0073*** -0.0008*** -0.0090*** -0.0012*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0003) 
Region: Northern  (Brong Ahafo as base) -0.4950*** -0.0576*** 0.0454 0.0063 
 (0.1332) (0.0156) (0.1360) (0.0187) 
Upper East -0.2985** -0.0347** 0.2228* 0.0307* 
 (0.1371) (0.0160) (0.1307) (0.0180) 
Upper West -0.3274** -0.0381** 0.2185 0.0301 
 (0.1333) (0.0155) (0.1333) (0.0184) 
Volta -0.2767* -0.0322* -0.0282 -0.0039 
 (0.1581) (0.0184) (0.1486) (0.0205) 
Network at destination (Dummy) 3.1964*** 0.3719*** 4.5338*** 0.6247*** 
 (0.1134) (0.0138) (0.3265) (0.0451) 
consumption quintile 2 (1 as base) -0.2234*** -0.0260*** -0.0546 -0.0075 
 (0.0818) (0.0095) (0.0691) (0.0095) 
consumption quintile 3 -0.2192** -0.0255** -0.0798 -0.0110 
 (0.0862) (0.0100) (0.0738) (0.0102) 
consumption quintile 4 -0.4869*** -0.0567*** -0.0469 -0.0065 
 (0.1012) (0.0119) (0.0807) (0.0111) 
consumption quintile 5 -0.6525*** -0.0759*** -0.0558 -0.0077 
 (0.1229) (0.0144) (0.0939) (0.0129) 
migrant in 2015   0.8703*** 0.1199*** 
   (0.0751) (0.0103) 
Constant -0.7004***  -1.5744***  
 (0.2022)  (0.1768)  
Observations 4,958 4,958 6,658 6,658 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix III 
 
Average annual remittances sent by individual migrants by wave, gender and region in 2018 
prices 
Region 
Male Female 
mean median std N mean median std N 
2015 
Brong 
Ahafo 2279.3 1473.5 2457.7 32 1184.5 884.1 1144.7 13 
Northern 853.2 683.0 710.5 24 570.0 508.6 421.2 9 
Upper East 652.1 271.8 1297.2 63 550.5 271.8 1023.8 9 
Upper West 1041.8 668.0 1102.5 38 669.9 296.9 783.0 12 
Volta 585.4 420.2 716.9 34 506.6 343.2 459.9 26 
Total 1015.6 442.1 1507.0 191 676.7 420.2 785.1 69 
 2018 
Brong 
Ahafo 2361.9 1200.0 2361.8 72 1213.9 600.0 1373.4 33 
Northern 865.7 400.0 1290.2 67 471.5 250.0 674.0 39 
Upper East 787.7 400.0 1093.4 111 508.9 250.0 651.0 37 
Upper West 2187.1 1500.0 1902.2 94 1488.0 1500.0 1288.1 25 
Volta 937.6 400.0 1427.1 127 1033.3 450.0 1532.8 90 
Total 1359.1 600.0 1751.9 471 926.2 500.0 1284.6 224 
 
 
Household Consumption Calculations 
The section on consumption expenditure includes separate food and non-food items. The food 
section requested for weekly food consumption. The values of all food items per week were 
summed, to obtain a household weekly consumption, which was then annualized by multiplying 
by 52. The nonfood section contains several items on a monthly basis. These were annualized, by 
multiplying by 12. The sum of these nonfood items was added to the sum of other nonfood items 
requested on an annual basis for each household. Thus, two variables for annual food 
expenditure and annual nonfood expenditure were computed in 2015 and 2018 values for each 
wave. 
To obtain real values of expenditures in 2012 prices, the values for each household were deflated 
with an index. A regional inflation index (separate for food and nonfood) was computed using 
figures from the CPI reports of the Ghana Statistical Service, with 2012 as the base year (reported 
for each region in Table A1). The real values in 2012 prices of food and nonfood for each 
household were summed to arrive at annual household consumption.  The poverty analysis in 
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the GLSS is based on adult equivalence. The adult equivalence, based on age and gender, which 
is used in the analysis of poverty for Ghana in the GLSS was replicated and used to divide the real 
values for each household to arrive at adult equivalent annual consumption for each household.  
 
Table A1: Regional figures used to deflate to obtain real consumption in 2012 prices 
Converting from 2015 to 2012 prices Converting from 2018 to 2012 
prices 
 Region Food Non-food Food Non-food 
BRONG AHAFO 1.22 1.6 1.487 2.605 
NORTHERN 1.29 1.6 1.577 2.587 
UPPER EAST 1.16 1.66 1.265 2.545 
UPPER WEST 1.22 1.46 1.43 2.438 
VOLTA 1.26 1.64 1.515 2.548 
 
From the poverty report for GLSS7, the “poverty line of GH¢1,314.0 per adult equivalent per year 
and an extreme poverty line of GH¢792.2 per adult equivalent per year” were used in 2012/13 
prices (Ghana Statistical Service, 2018, p9). A household is categorized as non-poor if the annual 
adult equivalent expenditure is above GH¢1,314.0, otherwise is it categorized as poor. The 
consumption quintiles were computed using the values for the annual adult equivalent 
expenditure at the household level.  
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Appendix IV: Some statistics generated with data from GLSS6 and 
GLSS7 
Table A2: Ghana’s changes in poverty incidence between 2012/13 and 2016/17 
Region 
Poverty incidence Incidence of extreme poverty 
2012/13 2016/17 2012/13 2016/17 
Brong Ahafo 27.9 26.8 6.6 8.7 
Northern 50.4 61.1 22.8 30.7 
Upper East 44.4 54.8 21.3 27.7 
Upper West 70.7 70.9 45.1 45.2 
Volta 33.8 37.3 9 11.4 
All Ghana 24.2 23.4 8.4 8.2 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2018) 
 
Table A3: Poverty incidence for Ghana’s rural areas 
Rural Area 2012/13 (GLSS 6) 2016/17 (GLSS 7) 
Rural Western 29.8 29.7 
Rural Central 23.7 20.4 
Rural Gt. Accra 35.2  5.8 
Rural Volta 39.0 46.6 
Rural Eastern 29.8 19.1 
Rural Ashanti 23.3 21.3 
Rural Brong Ahafo 36.3 38.9 
Rural Northern 61.1 74.3 
Rural Upper East 50.1 64.8 
Rural Upper West 80.3 80.5 
Entire Country 24.2 23.4 
Authors’ computation from GLSS6 and GLSS7 datasets 
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About Migrating out of Poverty 
 
Migrating out of Poverty research programme consortium is funded by the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID). It focuses on the relationship between migration and poverty 
– especially migration within countries and regions – across Asia and Africa. The main goal of 
Migrating out of Poverty is to provide robust evidence on the drivers and impacts of migration 
in order to contribute to improving policies affecting the lives and well-being of impoverished 
migrants, their communities and their countries through a programme of innovative research, 
capacity building and policy engagement.  
  
Migrating out of Poverty is coordinated by the University of Sussex and led by Research Director 
Dr Priya Deshingkar and Dr Robert Nurick as Executive Director. Core partners are the Centre for 
Migration Studies (CMS) at the University of Ghana, and the African Centre for Migration & 
Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, the Organisation for Social 
Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia 
and L’Université Assane Seck Ziguinchor (UASZ) in Senegal. Past partners included the Refugee 
and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) in Bangladesh, the Asia Research Institute 
(ARI) at the National University of Singapore; and the African Migration and Development Policy 
Centre (AMADPOC) in Kenya. Please visit the website for more information. 
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